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The Show Must Go On: British Industrial Strategy and the Creative 
Industries
Film, music, and the arts are vital parts of Britain’s economy. These creative 
industries, James Silverwood and Kiev Ariza, argue have benefited from 
targeted industrial strategies that have often gone unrecognised but will be 
needed more than ever post-Brexit. 
In early January 2021, barely a week after the end of the Brexit transition 
period, it was reported that British musicians, artists and other creatives 
would not have visa-free travel within the European Union. The response was 
rapid, and furious. The Incorporated Society of Musicians organised an open 
letter. Oasis frontman Liam Gallagher shared a stage with award-winning 
violinist Nicola Benedetti and classical conductor Sir Simon Rattle, all 
criticising Boris Johnson’s government for ‘shamefully failing’ British 
musicians. Elsewhere, Sir Elton John, a fellow signatory of the open letter, 
exhorted his fellow musicians, with the ferocity of any stanza in Rocketman, to 
‘go into battle’ on the issue. Not to be outdone, a letter arranged by the trade 
union Equity, signed by stars of stage and screen from Abiola Ogunbiyi to Sir 
Ian McKellen to Shelia Hancock, lambasted the prime minister. The Johnson 

















admitting they had rejected an EU proposal on visa-free travel because it had 
been ‘conflating general freedom of movement/work with specific provision for 
musicians/artists’. 
This utterance from Caroline Dinenage, Minister of State for Digital and 
Culture, illustrates an inherent tension between Brexit and industrial policy. 
Johnson has said that Brexit will release the national economy from the 
shackles of EU state-aid rules, allowing the British state to more flexibly 
support British business. In February, Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS) announced on an eight-week consultation period to 
design a new ‘subsidy control system’ with the aim of allowing the UK ‘to be 
more dynamic in providing support to businesses, including in 
innovative, R&D-focused industries, to encourage job creation and growth 
across all parts of the UK’. No doubt these will appear warm words to those 
industries who found the requirements they needed jettisoned from the EU-UK 
Trade and Cooperation agreement.
Industrial strategy is long-term strategic economic management that provides a 
framework for industrial policy. Johnson and his government have been 
extremely quiet about industrial strategy since taking office, preferring instead 
to discuss individual industrial policies such as state-aid or ‘Project Birch’ –
the government’s mechanism to provide emergency funding in exchange for 















likely that BEIS will lose its responsibilities for industrial strategy, with the 
economic agenda set thereafter by the Treasury. A retreat from the industrial 
strategy put in place by the Theresa May (described by Kwasi Kwarteng, 
current Secretary of State for BEIS, as a ‘pudding without a theme’) appears to 
be in process. In her bid to become leader of the Conservative party, Theresa 
May promised to implement a ‘proper industrial strategy to get the economy 
firing’. As Prime Minister, May set about reforming the machinery of industrial 
policy. As well as establishing BEIS, the May government published a white 
paper setting out the industrial policies, including sector deals for industry and 
support for R&D, to improve productivity performance and meet four grand 
challenges of the ageing society, clean growth, mobility and data and AI.
This flurry of activity provoked sometimes-breathless commentary among 
media and think-tanks about the ‘return of industrial policy’ but this narrative 
merely served to mask that successive British governments in previous decades 
had never abandoned it. This was more obviously the case between 2008-2016 
when the Brown and Coalition government began a public experimentation 
with interventionist economic policies, but it was evident in the decades prior 
to the global financial crisis as well. Hidden behind rhetoric that emphasised
an abhorrence of ‘picking winners’ and a reluctance to use the term, British 
governments nevertheless re-directed industrial policy between 1979-2008 
towards improving the international competitiveness of certain economic 
sectors and making their markets an attractive location for international 
 












capital. Nowhere has this been more in evidence than in the evolution of ‘film 
policy’ since the 1980s, from which contemporary British creative industrial 
policy can be traced. 
Industrial Policy and the British Film Industry
Magor and Schlesinger (2009) provide an excellent outline of the development 
of industrial policy directed towards the British film industry. In line with the 
neoliberal persuasion of her economic policy, Thatcher’s governments spent the 
1980s progressively dismantling the subsidy and protection erected around the 
British film industry since the Cinematograph Film Act 1927. This free-market 
experiment led to a significant fall in the number of films produced in Britain, 
and in June 1990, a seminar on how to revive the British film industry was 
held in Downing Street. Attended by industry insiders and chaired by 
Thatcher, the seminar included discussions on measures to promote inwards 
investment from the United States and the promotion of British films overseas. 
Thatcher’s defenestration only five months later means we will never know if 
the ‘lady was for turning’ on the issue of industrial policy for the British film 
industry. The mantle falling instead on the newly incumbent Major government 
who introduced the major innovation of tax relief for films that qualified as 









   
  
    






over the long-run, but still worth noting, the Major government also sanctioned 
the distribution of National Lottery funding to support the film industry. 
The incoming New Labour government ran with this legacy, providing 100 per 
cent relief against taxable profits on the production and acquisition costs of 
films certified as British with budgets less than £15million. New Labour 
disbursed some £2billion worth of subsidy to the film industry between 1997 
and 2006.
Dissatisfaction with these changes led to their eventual replacement with the 
UK Film Tax Relief (FTR), which came into effect on the 1 January 2007. Still 
available, FTR has developed such that it provides a cash rebate direct to 
production companies of 25 per cent of qualifying expenditure (incurred during 
the act of filming such as pre-production, principal photography, and post-
production in the UK) with further tax relief available worth 80 per cent of core 
expenditure on production. FTR is made available to all films that can pass a 
‘cultural test’, originally designed by the New Labour government to ensure the 
policy met EU rules on state aid, proving they promote either British or 
European cultural content and practitioners, disseminate British culture or 
heritage, or aid the development of Britain as a cultural hub for film. 








The election of New Labour in 1997 saw film policy subsumed within broader 
policy directed at the creative industries. A mapping document published in 
1998 (followed by another in 2001) defined the creative industries as those 
‘which have their origin in individual creative, skill and talent’ and ‘the 
potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of 
intellectual property’ identifying examples from advertising to film to music to 
publishing. The mapping exercises led to the creation of a raft of corporatist 
structures within Whitehall, such as the Creative Industries Task Force and 
Ministerial Creative Industries Strategy Groups, to encourage export promotion 
and development of regional creative industries amongst other targets. 
Defeat at the 2010 general election left later plans for the creative industries by 
New Labour, in their 2008 ‘Creative Britain’ and 2009 ‘Digital Britain’ reports, 
unfulfilled. Subsequent Coalition and Conservative governments extended tax 
relief to animation, high-end television, and video games (2012 budget), 
theatres (2014 budget), children’s television (2015 budget), orchestra’s (2016 
budget) and museums and galleries (2017 budget). As part of her industrial 
strategy, the May government’s sector deal for the creative industries
broadened the scope of policy away from tax including a raft of public 
expenditure commitments such as a £20million Cultural Development Fund, 
£58million to promote immersive technologies, and a £64million creation of an 
Arts and Humanities Research Council to deliver partnerships between 












commitment to this augmentation of creative industrial policy with its 
formation of a £250m Culture Investment Fund (£50m distributed per annum 
over a five-year period) before the Covid pandemic brought a £1.57billion crisis-
driven bailout of arts, cultural and heritage and £500million Film and TV 
Production Restart Scheme to induce companies to resume filming. 
Demand for tax relief across some creative industries, such as animation, 
children’s television programming, and theatres, has been stable. Video games 
and high-end television meanwhile has seen rapid growth accelerating per 
annum from £45million in 2015-16 to £121million in 2019-20, and £52million 
in 2013-14 to £324million in 2019-20, respectively. These figures are dwarfed 
however by the annual relief delivered to the film industry rising from 
£100million in 2007-08 to £522million in 2019-20. This pattern is reiterated in 
Figure 1, which showathat the big winners from the introduction of tax relief 
has been the film industry (£3.9billion), high-end television (£1.1billion), and 
video games (£444million). The £3.9billion total for the film industry actually 







   






7% Figure 3: Distribution of Tax Relief 
Children's Television Tax Relief 
Film Tax Relief 
High-End Television Tax Relief 
Museums and Galleries Exhibition Tax 
Relief 
Orchestra Tax Relief 
Theatre Tax Relief 
In total, £7.925billion of subsidy has been granted to the creative industries in 
the form of tax relief since 1997-98, but the annual figures are ever higher. 
Whereas only £100million of tax relief was distributed in 2007-08 (the 
introduction of the new film tax relief saw a sharp drop in claims from the 
previous regime) by 2019-20 this figure had risen to £1.114billion as more and 
more tax reliefs have been directed at the creative industries. 
Furthermore, the £7.925billion of creative industrial policy quoted above is 
purely from tax relief. It does not include the more conventional forms of 
industrial policy for the creative industries implemented by the May and 
Johnson governments, which alone would add approximately £2-3billion to the 











    
as funding for the film industry delivered by the National Lottery, which for 
illustrative example amounted to £423million between 1995 and 2005. 
British Industrial Policy
The existence of considerable creative industrial policy in Britain since the 
1990s poses twin academic challenges. The first relates to how we define the 
term ‘industrial policy’ in the British context. Whilst there are myriad 
competing definitions of industrial policy many now coalesce around the 
formulation established by Ha-Joon Chang (2003: 112) of ‘policy aimed at 
particular industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes 
that are perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole’. The 
public good targeted by industrial policy is often identified as productivity, the 
begetter of which is civilian manufacturing with whom industrial policy is often 
identified (Berry, 2016). Chang’s definition of industrial policy however can be 
discounted because it limits our understanding of the scope of British 
industrial policy. It has become unduly associated with civilian manufacturing 
meaning that recipients of industrial policy from outside this economic sector, 
such as the creative industries, are often overlooked as are those implemented 
to secure objectives other than the macroeconomic. 
Competing definitions of industrial policy that rest on separation between 
horizontal (to improve the conditions throughout the entire economy) and 














us no further towards a definition of industrial policy appropriate for the 
British context supplying arbitrary distinction between ‘types’ of industrial 
policy. In reality, the boundaries between horizontal and vertical industrial 
policies are often hazy, with even seemingly non-interventionist economic 
policies (horizontal) often favouring certain economic sectors (vertical). 
Likewise, public policies that don’t appear to have an immediate economic 
component can often be found upon investigation to direct significant state 
support to specific economic sectors and firms. 
A more suitable definition of industrial policy in Britain comes from El-Agraa
(1997), who characterises industrial policy as ‘any state measure designed 
primarily to affect the allocation of resources between economic activities’. This 
definition enables us to identify industrial policy through the intention of the 
policymaker, and not through excessive focus on policy objectives or 
instruments. Additionally, it ensures inclusion of all policies that are aimed at 
specific economic sectors or firms, importantly including those that are not
explicitly described as industrial policy by government. For instance, it is only 
since 2017 that the tax reliefs directed at the creative industries have been 
explicitly identified as industrial despite their existence in relation to the film 
industry since the 1990s. 
The second relates to the perception that British industrial policy has 

















disappointments of the 1970s, but once we broaden our understanding of the 
economic sectors bestowed with industrial policy in Britain we find a number 
of notable successes. According to most recent statistics published by the 
British government, the creative industries (Advertising, Antiques, 
Architecture, Crafts, Design, Fashion, Film, Music, Performing Arts, 
Publishing, Software, TV and Radio) made a gross value-added contribution to 
the UK economy of £111.7bn to the UK Economy in 2018, the industry growing 
a little over 43% in real terms since 2010. This included a real term growth of 
7.4% from 2017 to 2018, five times more than the average rate of growth of the 
entire UK economy. Sustaining and growing the cultural industries will be a 
key post-Brexit task: picking fights with the EU, and creatives, will do little to 
help anybody.
James Silverwood and Kiev Ariza are both lecturers in emerging markets at
Coventry University.
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